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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
ACADEMIC FREEDOM GAINS FULL CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION
Should a member of the Communist Party who has knowledge
of its unlawful aims be allowed to teach in state institutions of
higher learning, if he be qualified otherwise? The United States
Supreme Court in Keyishian '. Board of Regents2 answered this
question affirmatively, further establishing full constitutional pro-
tection of academic freedom. Rejecting the premise " . . . that
public employment, including academic employment, may be
conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights. . , the
Court held unconstitutional New York's model statutory scheme
requiring loyalty oaths of state employees. Petitioner, an instruc-
tor in English at the privately owned University of Buffalo, was
denied state employment when the university was merged into
the State University of New York, solely because of his refusal
to sign the so-called "Feinberg Certificate'" disclaiming present
Communist Party membership and stating that if he ever had
been a member of the party he had notified the president of the
university of that fact.
Although the Court had upheld portions of the act as late
as 1952, Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the five member ma-
jority, quickly disposed of any controlling effect of the Adler case
by overruling the premise of conditional employment on which
'Assume for the moment that the Communist Party can be shown to
be presently advocating the violent overthrow of government so as
to make its aims unlawful.
'Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 87 Sup. Ct. 675 (1967).
3Id. at 685.
4N.Y. Civ. SER. LAW § 105; N.Y. ED. LAw §§ 3021, 3022; RULES OF
THE BOARD OF REGENTS, ARTICLE XVIII, § 244 (Adopted July 15,
1949).
5 REsoLuToNs OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE STATE UNI-
VERSITY OF NEw YORK, NO. 56-98 (adopted October 11, 1956) since
-escinded and amended: RESOLUTIONS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES
OF THE STATE UNIvSsITY, OF NEw YORK, No. 65-100 (adopted
May 13, 1965).6Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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it stood. Relying on cases subsequent to Adler, Mr. Justice Bren-
nan found it "... . too late in the day to doubt that the liberties
of religion and expression may be infringed by a denial of or
placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."' Making refer-
ence to cases such as Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners' and
Torcasco v. Watkins," dealing with state imposed conditions on
the granting of benefits and privileges from state boards, the
Court appears to negate all such conditions which require a "sur-
render of constitutional rights."
However, the Court went further than to just bury the premise
of conditional employment. It witnessed the decline and fall of
the "knowledgeable membership test" which grew out of Wieman
v. Updegraff." In Wieman, the Court held unconstitutional an
Oklahoma statute which made Communist Party membership
alone sufficient cause for terminating state employment. Striking
the statute down as an ". . . assertion of arbitrary power""' the
Court negated all similar statutes which were based on an "in-
discriminate classification of innocent with knowing ... ."" This
"knowledgeable membership" test survived in cases such as Sloch-
ower v. Board of Health and Education,4 Adler v. Board of
Education,"5 Garner v. Board of Public Works," and Cramp v.
Board of Public Instruction,"' as separate and apart from co-exist-
ing cases dealing with subversive memberships of the private in-
dividual as controlled under the Smith Act."8 The effect of these
two different lines of cases was to allow a state to prescribe higher
7See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Morris,
Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
487 (1963).
'Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
' Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
"
0Torcasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
"Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
I21d. at 191.1Id.
"Slochower v. Board of Health and Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
"s Supra note 6.
"Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
"Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
"Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1962).
19671
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 4 [1967], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol4/iss2/10
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
degrees of loyalty from individuals seeking government employ-
ment than could be criminally punished under the Smith Act. A
state could bar members of subversive organizations who had
knowledge of the unlawful aims of the organization from state
employment, though their affiliations were not of sufficient
gravity to illicit criminal sanctions under the Smith Act cases such
as Scales v. United States."
Mr. Justice Brennan destroys this distinction. The Keyishian
decision eliminates the "knowledgeable membership" test, as ap-
plied to state employees as a condition of employment, in favor
of the "active purposeful membership" guideline utilized to test
criminal sanctions under the Smith Act. Recognizing the denial
of governmental employment as a penalty, Mr. Justice Brennan
states, . . . legislation which sanctions membership unaccom-
panied by specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the or-
ganization, or which is not active membership, violates constitu-
tional limitations."2 This is identical to the Scales decision dealing
with subversive memberships of private citizens, requiring that
" . . . the membership must be an 'active' one with a 'specific
intent' to further the aims of the subversive organization""1 before
a state may legitimately apply negative criminal sanctions. Hence,
a teacher's membership must now constitute criminal aspects be-
fore a state can either deny him employment or criminally punish
him.
Keyishian does not stand alone in its theory. Considerable sup-
port is mustered from the two recent cases of Aptheker v. Secretary
of State" and Elfbrant v. Russell" which are on point and hold
in accord with Keyishian, although the force of their decisions is
somewhat muted by discussions of criminal presumptions. Mr.
Justice Douglas in Elfbrant could find no threat to the state from
public employees ". . . who join an organization but do not share
its unlawful purposes and who do not participate in its unlawful
PP24
activities ....
" Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
2Supra note 2 at 686.
1, Supra note 19 at 221.
"Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
"Elfbrant v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
'Id. at 17.
[Vol 4, No. 2
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Although the Court adopted more stringent safeguards with
which to test the constitutionality of loyalty oath statutes on their
face, it did not relax the procedural safeguards which attach to
their application. "Vagueness of wording is aggravated by pro-
lixity and profusion of statutes, regulations, and administrative
machinery, and by manifold cross-references to interrelated enact-
ments and rules."' The Court interprets the constitution as re-
quiring a simplicity of administration on the one hand, while
demanding full procedural due process of law on the other. This
appears to be a difficult task in light of the intricacies of due
process of law which, by its very nature, entails a certain degree
of "prolixity and profusion" of administrative machineries. Justi-
fication for these magnanimous standards is found by reference to
NA.A.C.P. v. Button? which states "[biecause First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regu-
late in the area only with narrow specificity."' Thus, the Court
in Keyishian finds the "... . regulatory maze created by New York
wholly lacking in terms 'susceptible of objective measurement'"
rendering it unconstitutional due to vagueness because of ".. . the
absence of sensitive tools which clearly inform teacher what is
being sanctioned."2
Though the Court does not question the "... legitimacy of
New York's interest in protecting its educational system from
subversion... ."' it seems to disassociate this interest from the right
of the state to self protection. In Sweezy v. New Hanmpshir " Mr.
Justice Frankfurter suggested that a free society depended upon
free universities and this required the exclusion of governmental
intervention from the university campus. He described the Court's
role as one of balancing the right of the citizen to political privacy
against the right of the state to self-protection. In Keyishian, ap-
parently Mr. Justice Brennan feels that the state cannot preserve
itself as a democratic government without safeguarding the poli-
2SKeyishian v. Board of Regents, supra note 20, at 684.
2'NA.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
2Id. at 433.
" Supra note 2 at 684.
'id.
"Id. at 683.31Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (concurring opinion).
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tical privacy of its citizens, including those publicly employed.
The two interests dichotomized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter and
others (this view also obtains in the dissent of Mr. Justice Clark
who is joined by Justices Harlan, Stewart and White) are merged
into the identical interest by Mr. Justice Brennan in Keyishian.
One becomes impossible without the other, thereby disallowing
the placing of conditions upon the public employment in state
universities short of permissible criminal limitations under the
Smith Act.
There can be no doubt that the Supreme Court has narrowed
the permissive breadth of state legislation in the area of inquiry
by the state into the political affiliations of its employees, includ-
ing employees of state owned and operated universities. By follow-
ing up its decisions in Aptheker and Elfbrant, the Court is en-
deavoring to protect abstract expression, interchange and interplay
of ideas, theoretical improvision and the professional associations
of the university's faculty, all of which constitute the integral
parts of academic freedom. Thus, academic freedom clearly gains
full constitutional protection for the first time in our history as
yet another "freedom" is afforded the intricate protection under
the ever expanding "wall" of the Constitution.
While the language of the Constitution does not change, the
changing circumstances of a progressive Society for which it was
designed, yield new and fuller import to its meaning.*
By applying the Scales test of active and purposeful member-
ship to state loyalty oath statutes, the Court has changed the in-
terpretation from which numerous statutes have been drawn. All
such statutes, including the one in the State of Oklahoma,' which
are based on the "knowledgable membership" test developed
under the Wieman case are now of questionable validity and
presumably they will have to be revised. The new test of active
and purposeful membership requires a long list of safeguards:
1. Membership in a subversive organization which is known by
3id. at 266.
"OKILA. STAT. tit. 51 § 36, 1-6 (1961), worded in part as follows: "I
will not advocate ... directly or indirectly, and will not become a
member of ... the Communist Party ... or any party ... known to
me to advocate . . . sedition, treason . . . or the overthrow of the
government of the United States .... "
EVol. 4, No. 2
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the member to presently advocate the violent overthrow of
government.
2. A specific intent to further this unlawful aim.
3. An active participation in the unlawful activities of the or-
ganization.
All the while the statute must allow due process of law which
does not incorporate vague terminology while implementing the
process with a simplicity of administration. The task for future
drafters of state loyalty oath statutes appears to be most demand-
ing, if in fact any need for them still exists exclusive of the pro-
tection afforded the state under the Smith Act.
Thomas F. Golden
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